Ministerial Countersignature in the Constitutional System of Jordan

Abstract

The parliamentary system in Jordan, established by the 1952 Constitution, contains a double executive structure composed of the king and the government. Article 30 of the Constitution grants the monarch immunity from government liability, requiring that such liability be transferred to the Council of Ministers. The constitutional changes introduced in 2016 and 2022 have created exceptions that allow the king to issue unilateral decrees, raising questions about parliament's role and responsibilities. This qualitative study is based on in-depth interviews with legal and political experts (n = 15) to explore the historical development, practical application, and constitutional compatibility of these provisions within Jordan's unique institutional framework. Particular attention is paid to the principle of ministerial advice—a key mechanism designed to ensure government responsibility—which the recent expansion of the royal privilege has increasingly circumvented. The finding suggests that the growing use of exceptions undermines ministerial responsibility and challenges the constitutional balance of powers. The study requires redefining or limiting these exceptions to maintain constitutional legitimacy and democratic administration. Comparative knowledge is drawn from European and regional systems to contextualize Jordan's experience and reform design.